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REPORT

February 12, 1953

DISCUSSION OF PSB PLAN D-22

A PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PROGRAM FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

The following were present at a meeting on Tuesday, February 10, to consider IIA action in connection with PSB plan D-22: 25X1A

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IMS representative [REDACTED] could not attend.

25X1A

This communication will be the only one dealing with the development of IIA programming for the Middle East which will refer directly to the PSB paper D-22. Other papers on the substance of the meeting and all matters relating to programming for the Middle East will bear a lower classification.

Psychological Objectives. In the opinion of NEA and IIA the following four objectives of the six contained in PSB D-22 are, in view of current political considerations and of the current status of United States policy, the most important for IIA implementation.

(a) To strengthen confidence in the integrity of the United States, in the principles for which it stands, and in the sincere friendship which the United States has for the peoples of this area.

(b) To convince

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- (b) To convince the leaders and opinion-forming groups of the Middle East of the identity of their interests with the free world.
- (c) To promote a realistic awareness of the threat to the aspirations and self-interests of the peoples of the Middle East that is posed by Communism, Soviet imperialism and Soviet-inspired revolution.
- (e) To encourage progressive elements to advance constructive programs for the improvement of economic and social conditions which will produce a political stability better able to combat the twin extremes of Communism and anti-Western politico-religious fanaticism.

The meeting reviewed these objectives together with the basic tasks suggested by PSB and came to the following conclusions:

With regard to Objective (a):

The three major tasks suggested in PSB #22 will depend upon the taking of substantive political action over and above current United States policy. Until such actions are taken there is relatively little that IIA can do in connection with these tasks beyond that which is called for by current guidance. Task 4 reflects standard IIA procedures which are constantly under study for improved application in information programming and content.

With regard to Objective (b):

Task No. 1 requires political action. Tasks Nos. 2, 3 and 5 already have the highest priority in IIA programming and will be the subject of continuing studies for determining what further effective actions can be taken. Task No. 4 will be studied by IES and IFI.

With regard to Objective (c):

IIA policy on the three tasks listed under this objective is defined in PO Instruction 3, "Positive Content in Programming to the NEA Area". Exposing of Soviet imperialism and the

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countering of Communist influence is the single most important concern of all elements of IIA. It was the opinion of the meeting that Task 2 (a) (the development at each Mission of an essential and coordinated plan by which personal contacts are utilized to counteract Communism) is of major importance and should be effected at the earliest possible date. Since this is a matter that must be handled primarily by our Missions overseas, the initiative lies with NEA.

With regard to Objective (e):

The complexity and delicate nature of Tasks Nos. 1 and 2, together with nuances of treatment required by local political considerations, make desirable the establishment of a subcommittee to advise IIA on these points. Tasks Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are dependent upon politico-economic action and can be treated by IIA only in terms of substantive developments of such a matter. Task No. 6 relating to trade union movements is a matter on which IIA can only touch upon marginally.

With regard to the two remaining Objectives (d) and (f) and to the Tasks suggested thereunder, NEA will advise IIA when political decisions indicate the advisability of reviewing current information policy.

Special Considerations.

1. It was generally agreed that the level of military strength which the United States is prepared to indicate in matters relating to the Middle East is a key factor in the conduct of psychological operations directed toward the Middle East. IIA programming should give foremost consideration to this point and should ensure that maximum advantage is taken of every opportunity to demonstrate the effective strength of the United States.

2. It was agreed that IIA operation should be reviewed with a view to increasing the use of indigenous instruments and local channels and that all IIA plans should be made with this objective in mind.

3. Special attention will be given to improving training and indoctrination of IIA personnel with a view to furthering the conduct of all IIA activities in a manner that gives appropriate and careful consideration to the basic cultural, social and psychological factors of the people of the area.

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4. While the importance of personal contacts has always been recognized in the development of IIA programs, it was considered that further attention should be given to this key factor in the psychological efforts in the Middle East. Training, assignment and review of personnel should be conducted in such a way as to maximize the element of personal contact in all IIA activities conducted in the Middle East.

Action Assignments:

In preparing the covering instruction transmitting PSB D-22 to the Missions, NEA/P will draw the attention of the Missions particularly to the need of reviewing USIS country plans in the light of the PSB paper, to the importance of a plan for coordinating and directing personal contacts, to the need for an evaluation of the adequacy of present training of personnel, and particularly to the importance of developing coordinated Mission efforts for further using local channels.

Other action assignments determined at the meeting will be covered in subsequent communications which will not refer to the PSB paper and which will bear a lower classification.

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4. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

*Report of PSB Plan D-22
a Psychological Strategy Prog.
for Middle East dated 2/12/53*

25X1A

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
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			TIME	DATE	TIME	DATE
	DL	<i>1 to 2: Mike - This is the meeting I attended. For what it is worth, I send you this report of it.</i>				

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D-22

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[REDACTED]		27 Feb		[REDACTED]	
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